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LABOR LAW - Interboro Doctrine Constitutes Reasonable
Interpretation of Section 7 of NLRA. NLRB v. City Disposal
Systems, 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
The Interboro doctrine' provides that an individual's hon-
est and reasonable assertion2 of a right grounded in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is concerted activity within the
meaning of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,3
even in the absence of interest by fellow employees.4 Section 7
protects employees against employer sanctions when they en-
gage in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection.5 In
NLRB v. City Disposal Systems 6 the United States Supreme
Court held that the National Labor Relations Board's In-
terboro doctrine constituted a reasonable interpretation of sec-
tion 7.7
By its holding, the Supreme Court resolved the dispute
which had existed between the Board and the circuits support-
ing the doctrine8 and those circuits that had rejected it.9 Jus-
1. The doctrine was enunciated in Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295
(1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
2. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (section 7 of the Act) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities ....
4. Interboro Contractors, 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298. The dissenting justices in City Dis-
posal Systems apparently misunderstood this aspect of the Interboro doctrine. Justice
O'Connor wrote that the doctrine made little sense when applied to this case because
there was no attempt to get other employees involved. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 104
S. Ct. 1505, 1519 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The District of Columbia Circuit
has made the same mistake. See Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981).
5. See supra note 3.
6. 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
7. Id. at 1510. See infra text accompanying note 62 for the standard of review of
Board interpretations of the Act.
8. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam);
NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Interboro
Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
9. See, e.g., Royal Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1983); Roadway
Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687 (1lth Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded, 104 S.
Ct. 1699 (1984); ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Buddies
Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d
173, 176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (questioning the validity of the doctrine), cert. denied, 450
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tice O'Connor, dissenting, 10 adhered to the view of the circuits
rejecting the doctrine."1 She stated that the Interboro doctrine
was an unwarranted exercise of legislative power by the
Board. 12
This Note will discuss the history of the Interboro doctrine
as set forth in the Board's decision and its treatment in the
courts of appeals. It will also examine the opinions in City
Disposal Systems discussing how the majority opinion creates
a disparity between the treatment of union and nonunion em-
ployees, while the dissent's criticism of the decision as an un-
warranted expansion of section 7 is without merit.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
James Brown was employed as a truck driver by City Dis-
posal Systems to haul garbage from Detroit to a landfill
outside the city. Brown was assigned to drive truck number
245. One day while hauling garbage, Brown experienced
problems with his truck. He took the truck back to the shop,
but was told the truck could not be repaired that day. Brown
reported to his supervisor who asked him to drive truck
number 244. A few days earlier brake problems on truck
number 244 had nearly caused a collision. 3 Brown refused to
drive the truck, stating that it was unsafe. Although he did
not specifically refer the supervisor to the collective bargain-
ing agreement, 14 he later claimed he was attempting to enforce
its provisions. 15 Brown subsequently clocked out and went
U.S. 931 (1981); NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1082-84 (8th Cir. 1977)
(finding statutory basis for Interboro doctrine questionable).
10. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
11. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1516-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 1517. See infra text accompanying notes 70-76.
13. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1509 (1984). Brown observed
truck number 244's difficulty and was, in fact, nearly involved in the collision. Id.
14. See infra text accompanying note 29.
15. City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1509. Article XXI of the collective bargaining
agreement provided:
The Employer shall not require employees to take out on the streets or highways
any vehicle that is not in safe operating condition or equipped with safety appli-
ances prescribed by law. It shall not be a violation of the Agreement where
employees refuse to operate such equipment unless such refusal is unjustified.
Id. at 1507-08.
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home. Later that day he received word that he had been dis-
charged because of his refusal to drive the truck. 16
Brown filed a grievance with his union. The union failed
to process it. Brown then filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board, challenging his discharge.7 The Administra-
tive Law Judge (ALJ) found that City Disposal committed an
unfair labor practice by discharging him.18 The Board
adopted the findings and conclusions of the ALJ and ordered
Brown reinstated with backpay. 19 The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit denied enforcement; 20 however, the United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with its decision.
II. THE Interboro Doctrine
Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees "the right. . . to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . ".. 21
Action by an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
[7]" constitutes an unfair labor practice22 and empowers the
Board to take action against the employer.23
As early as 1962, the Board found that an individual em-
ployee who was fired for requesting show-up-time pay,24
which he believed he was entitled to under a collective bar-
gaining agreement, was engaged in concerted activities.2 ' This
rule became known as the Interboro doctrine.26 In Interboro
16. Id. at 1509.
17. Brown claimed the company violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging
him. Id. See infra text accompanying note 22 for the text of § 8(a)(1).
18. City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1509.
19. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
20. City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1509. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
22. Id. § 158(a)(1).
23. See id. § 160(a).
24. Show-up-time pay is compensation for reporting to work when, through no
fault of the employee, work is unavailable. See Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B.
1516, 1516 n.1 (1962).
25. Id. at 1519.
26. For a general discussion of the development of the Interboro doctrine, see
Dolin, The Interboro Doctrine and the Courts: A History of Judicial Pronouncements on
the Protected Status of Individual Assertions of Collective Rights, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 551,
552-62 (1982).
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Contractors, Inc. ,27 the Board held that an individual's at-
tempt to assert a right under a collective bargaining agree-
ment was concerted activity, even in the absence of interest by
fellow employees. 28  The Board subsequently broadened this
protection by holding that the employee need not refer specifi-
cally to the collective bargaining agreement nor even be aware
of the existence of such an agreement.29
The Interboro doctrine caused a great deal of contro-
versy; 30 prior to City Disposal Systems, only a few circuits had
embraced it.31 Those that did placed some limitations on the
doctrine, such as requiring the assertion of the right to be a
reasonable one32 or requiring the employee to refer expressly
to the collective bargaining agreement. 3
Several circuits, however, believed the Board had exceeded
its jurisdiction in Interboro.4 They claimed that the statute
unambiguously called for some activity which looked toward
group action.35  These circuits criticized the Board for ex-
27. 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
28. See id. at 1298.
29. See, e.g., Michigan Screw Prods., 242 N.L.R.B. 811, 814 (1979); Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 278, 279 (1975), enforced, 532 F.2d 751 (1976). The Board
justified the Interboro doctrine on two grounds. First, the Board recognized that an
individual's attempt to implement the terms of a collective bargaining agreement was
but an extension of the concerted activity that gave rise to the agreement. Second, in
seeking to enforce the agreement, the rights and interests of all the employees were
affected. See Interboro Contractors, 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298. But see NLRB v. C & I Air
Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding Interboro doctrine inap-
plicable because express reference was not made to the collective bargaining agreement).
30. See generally Note, The Sixth Circuit Spurns Interboro and the Doctrine of Con-
structive Concerted Activity - ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, Leaves Non-union Employees at the
Mercy of Their Bosses, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 1045, 1059-63 (1980).
31. See supra note 8.
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205, 206-07 (7th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam); NLRB v. John Langenbacher Co., 398 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969). The Board itself requires only a good faith belief that the
right is grounded in the agreement. See, e.g., Transport Serv. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 910,
912 (1982); Varied Enters., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 126, 132 (1979).
33. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 310 (4th Cir.
1980) (the scope of the concerted activities in section 7 is essentially a jurisdictional
concern).
35. See, e.g., Royal Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 374 (9th Cir. 1983) (In-
terboro doctrine goes beyond the express language of section 7); ARO, Inc. v. NLRB,
596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979) (this expansive definition of the concerted activity
clause of section 7 "goes too far"); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d
Cir. 1971) (citing Webster's dictionary for the definition of "concerted"). But see
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panding the definition of the word "concerted" to include ac-
tivities that merely affected others in the bargaining unit.36
The idea that the assertion of a right was an extension of the
concerted activity that gave rise to the collective bargaining
agreement was denounced as a legal fiction.37
As a result, the courts rejecting the Interboro doctrine re-
quired that the action be made on behalf of other employees38
or at least have some relationship to group action.39 Under
this standard4° an employee who engaged the aid of another
employee 41 or a union representative,42 sought to present a
formal grievance,43 sought to represent other employees,' or
Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1160 (5th Cir. 1980) (the term "concerted
activities" should be construed as a term of art rather than a factual description);
Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 329-46 (1981) (the history of the
language and policy behind section 7 suggests an expansive reading of section 7).
36. See, e.g., Royal Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363, 374 (9th Cir. 1983); NLRB v.
Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971).
37. See NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971). See also
Gorman & Finkin, supra note 35, at 309 (the doctrine rests on "an accumulation of
fictions and fabricated presumptions"); Note, Protection of Individual Action as "Con-
certed Activity" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 387-
93 (1983) (criticizing the doctrine as a distortion and a fiction) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Concerted Activity]. But see Note, Labor Law - The Interboro Doctrine of "Con-
structive" Concerted Activity - A Logical Interpretation of Section 7 of the NLRA or a
Legal Fiction?, 7 J. CORP. L. 75, 90 (1981) (stating the Interboro doctrine is not a fic-
tion) [hereinafter cited as Note, Constructive Concerted Activity].
38. See, e.g., ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979). Accord
NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960).
39. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687, 694 (11th Cir. 1983),
vacated and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 1699 (1984); ARO, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718
(6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971); Mush-
room Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
40. The standard is known as the Mushroom Transportation test. See Dolin, supra
note 26, at 553-58; Comment, National Labor Relations Act Section 7: Protecting Em-
ployee Activity Through Implied Concert of Action, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 813, 821-25
(1981).
41. See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962); In-
terboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d
Cir. 1967).
42. See, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1975); NLRB v.
Adams Delivery Serv., Inc., 623 F.2d 96, 100 (9th Cir. 1980).
43. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 683 F.2d 156, 158 (6th Cir. 1982); Crown
Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 729 (5th Cir. 1970).
44. See, eg., NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Coop., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir.
1960) (it is not necessary to formally select a spokesperson). But cf. Southwest Latex
Corp. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 50, 56-57 (5th Cir. 1970) (self-appointed spokesperson that
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at least attempted to initiate some group action 45 was pro-
tected. An individual who made a personal gripe, however,
was not protected even if it was covered by the collective bar-
gaining agreement.46
Although the Board does not recognize purely personal
complaints by an individual as concerted activity,47 the Board
did, for a time, attempt to expand the Interboro doctrine to
include some situations in which no collective bargaining
agreement was in effect.48 In Alleluia Cushion Co. , 49a nonun-
ion employee who complained to the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration about various safety hazards was dis-
missed.50  The Board held that an individual who sought to
enforce statutory provisions designed for the benefit of all em-
ployees was engaged in concerted activities, in the absence of
any evidence that fellow employees disavowed such activi-
ties .5  The Board took this position still further in Air Surrey
Corp.,52 by holding that an individual's actions were concerted
when they related to conditions of employment that were mat-
ters of vital concern to all employees.5 3
The Board's decisions in Alleluia and Air Surrey never
gained acceptance by the courts of appeals.5 4 Even those cir-
cuits that supported the Interboro doctrine were not willing to
neither employees nor employer knew was acting on behalf of others was not engaged in
concerted activities).
45. See Comment, supra note 40, at 822-25, for examples of what activities courts
have found to be concerted.
46. See supra note 9 for those courts rejecting the Interboro doctrine.
47. See, e.g., Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1030
(1984); Comet Fast Freight Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 430, 431-32 (1982); Tabernacle Commu-
nity Hosp. & Health Center, 233 N.L.R.B. 1425, 1429 (1977). See also Gorman &
Finkin, supra note 35, at 289-93.
48. For a general discussion of the expansion of the Interboro doctrine, see Boh-
lander, Employee Protected Concerted Activity: The Nonunion Setting, 33 LAB. L.J. 344,
345-50 (1982); Murphy, Protected Concerted Activity and Refusals to Work, 34 LAB.
L.J. 654, 656-58 (1983); Note, Constructive Concerted Activity, supra note 37, at 91-93;
Comment, supra note 40, at 830-36.
49. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
50. See id. at 999.
51. See id. at 1000.
52. 229 N.L.R.B. 1064 (1977), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1979).
53. See id. at 1064.
54. See Note, Individual Rights for Organized and Unorganized Employees Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 58 TEx. L. REv. 991, 1010-12 (1980) (none of the
circuits protects unorganized individual activity).
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expand the doctrine to embrace the Alleluia holding. 5 The
Board has recently retreated from this position and has ex-
pressly overruled the Alleluia decision in Meyers Industries."
In Meyers, the Board criticized the Alleluia decision. Instead
of looking at the form of the activity to see if it was concerted
as required by the Act, the Board had instead looked to
whether the purpose of the activity warranted the Board's
protection.5 7 It distinguished the Interboro decision from Al-
leluia by stating that in the former case the focal point was the
attempted implementation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment; in the Alleluia situation, there was no such agreement
and, therefore, no attempt to enforce one. 8
Consequently, what has emerged are two lines of Board
philosophy. When a collective bargaining agreement is in ef-
fect, an individual's attempt to enforce a provision of the
agreement will be found to be concerted, even in the absence
of interest by fellow employees. 9 When there is no collective
bargaining agreement in effect, the Board will rely on an "ob-
jective standard" and find activity to be concerted only if it is
engaged in with another employee or on behalf of another
employee. °
III. THE OPINIONS
A. Majority
In NLRB v. City Disposal Systems 61 Justice Brennan noted
that it was the function of the Board, in the first instance, to
establish the scope of section 7 and that a reasonable construc-
tion by the Board is entitled to great deference when its exper-
55. See, e.g., Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980); Krispy
Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 1980); Pelton Casteel,
Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 30 (7th Cir. 1980).
56. 268 N.L.R.B. __, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (1984).
57. See id. at -, 115 L.R.R.M. at 1027.
58. See id. at , 115 L.R.R.M. at 1028. Accord Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238,
1242 (9th Cir. 1980). But see Comment, supra note 40, at 832 (statutes that protect
labor are partially a result of concerted action by employees and labor organizations
lobbying for enactment of these laws).
59. See Interboro Contractors, 157 N.L.R.B. at 1298.
60. See Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B .... 115 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1028-29 (1984).
61. 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
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tise is implicated.62 In this context, the Court found the
Board's interpretation of section 7 reasonable.63
The majority reasoned that an employee's invocation of a
right grounded in the collective bargaining agreement was
part of the same concerted activity that gave rise to the agree-
ment. The agreement was made by representatives of the
group for the benefit of the group; if it was not honored, the
power of the group could be brought to bear on the em-
ployer. 64  Thus, the mere fact that an individual employee's
assertion of a right under the collective bargaining agreement
was divorced in time from the agreement was not sufficient to
take the employee out of section 7 protection.
In examining the history of section 7,66 the majority noted
that the Interboro doctrine is not inconsistent with congres-
sional intent and is in fact consistent with the purpose of the
Act.67 The Court stated that Congress' intent was to equalize
the bargaining power of the employees to that of the em-
ployer, by allowing them to band together to face their em-
ployer.68  There is no indication that Congress intended to
limit that protection to situations in which employees com-
bined in certain ways or that Congress intended the protection
not to be extended to individuals who participated in an inte-
gral part of a single collective process.69
62. See id. at 1510. But cf. NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1198
n.9 (1984) (the Board's views are entitled to little deference when interpreting statutes
other than the Taft-Hartley Act).
63. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1510.
64. See id. at 1511. See also Dolin, supra note 26, at 556 (attempting to implement
the agreement constitutes group action as a matter of law); Note, Constructive Con-
certed Activity, supra note 37, at 90 (Interboro doctrine satisfied the requirement that
activity be related to group action).
65. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1511-12. The majority noted that section 7
protects individuals who join or assist labor organizations, although these actions are
also divorced in time and location from the actions of others. See id.
66. For a discussion of the history of section 7, see Gorman & Finkin, supra note
35, at 331-46.
67. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1512.
68. See id. at 1513. Prior to enactment of the labor laws, many states regarded
group protests by employees as unlawful conspiracies subject to criminal or civil sanc-
tions, while individual protests on the same matters were lawful. See Meyers Indus.,
268 N.L.R.B. -, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1032-33 (1984) (Zimmerman, dissenting).
See also Gorman & Finkin, supra note 35, at 331.
69. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1513. It has been suggested that Congress
merely wanted to allow employees to band together if they wished and not to take away
1985]
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B. Dissent
Justice O'Connor argued, as did the circuits rejecting the
Interboro doctrine, that the Board had exceeded its jurisdic-
tion and had engaged in an act of undelegated legislation. 0
Merely because the right an employee seeks to enforce is
grounded in the collective bargaining agreement does not
make the individual's action concerted."' If this were the case,
every contract claim could be the basis for an unfair labor
practice complaint, and O'Connor felt that this interpretation
was not a correct reading of the law.72 The labor laws were
designed to encourage employees to act together. Protecting
two employees acting together, while not extending this pro-
tection to an individual acting alone, was not inconsistent with
this purpose.73
the protection afforded to a single employee. See Illinois Ruan Transp. Corp. v. NLRB,
404 F.2d 274, 285-89 (8th Cir. 1968) (Lay, J., dissenting). See also Gorman & Finkin,
supra note 35, at 376-77. The majority also observed that although the primary means
of enforcing a collective bargaining agreement was the grievance procedure established
by the agreement, there was not likely to be a clear-cut distinction between a properly
filed grievance, a complaint to an employer, or even a refusal to perform a particular
job. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to extend section 7 protection to informal griev-
ances.
In addition, the majority made the following points. First, the argument that the
Interboro doctrine undermined the arbitration process is without merit. Second,
although the action may be found to be concerted, that does not preclude the possibility
that the activities may be found to be unprotected. Third, an employee should not be
denied the protection of section 7 simply because of a failure to refer to the collective
bargaining agreement. Finally, the majority noted that the employee's belief that the
right was grounded in the collective bargaining agreement need only be honest and
reasonable because questions of merit do not go into the determination of whether the
action was concerted or not. The Court pointed out that the arbitration process was
similarly undermined by allowing two employees, acting together, to make an informal
grievance and there is no reason to single out the Interboro doctrine as causing greater
harm. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1513-15. See also supra text accompanying
notes 28 & 34; Note, Constructive Concerted Activity, supra note 37, at 76.
70. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1517 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra
text accompanying notes 34-37.
71. 104 S. Ct. at 1517.
72. See id. Cf. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 426-28 (1967) (Con-
gress determined the Board should not have general jurisdiction over all alleged viola-
tions of collective bargaining agreements but that some jurisdiction should be vested in
the courts.); Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
931 (1981).
73. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1518. But see Note, supra note 54, at 1001-
02 (protecting individual activity does not undermine unionization).
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The dissent criticized the majority's position that the indi-
vidual action was tied to the concerted activity creating the
agreement. Such reasoning confused substantive contractual
entitlements with the process by which these entitlements are
vindicated. O'Connor stated that when employees act to-
gether their action is concerted, and the statute entitles them
to seek enforcement through the Board. An individual ex-
pressing a personal concern, however, must seek enforcement
through the union74 or the courts.75 In other words, to find
concerted activity, an employee must act with, or expressly on
behalf of, one or more other employees.76
IV. CRITIQUE
The majority's opinion in NLRB v. City Disposal Sys-
tems, 77 holding that the Board's Interboro doctrine is a reason-
able interpretation of section 7,78 recognized the Board's
expertise in labor relations and its function of interpreting and
administering the Act.79 In recognizing the validity of the In-
terboro doctrine, the Court equated an individual's assertion
of a right under the collective bargaining agreement with a
formal grievance, an act which is recognized by the courts as
concerted activity.80 In the ordinary situation, employees will
probably still go to their union representatives for help or to
file formal grievances. 8' This decision, however, will protect
employees in situations in which a "work now-grieve later"
process would not be sufficient to protect the interests of the
employees, 82 as illustrated in the present case, in which an in-
jury could have resulted had the employee driven the truck.
The Interboro doctrine also extends protection to cases in
74. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1518. Accord NLRB v. Adams Delivery
Serv., Inc., 623 F.2d 96, 100 (9th Cir. 1980) (when employee enlists the aid of union the
requirement of concert is found).
75. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1518. See generally Note, supra note 54, at
994-95 (federal statutes protect employees from discharge on the basis of color, race,
religion, sex, national origin, and age).
76. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1519.
77. 104 S. Ct. 1505 (1984).
78. See id. at 1510.
79. See id. at 1513-14.
80. See supra text accompanying note 43.
81. See Comment, supra note 40, at 829.
82. See id.
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which the union declines to process the grievance or in which
other employees not similarly situated may not want to be-
come involved. 3
The majority noted that there is nothing to indicate that
Congress wished to withdraw the section 7 protection when a
single employee "participates in an integral aspect of a collec-
tive process."" 4 However, by focusing on the fact that con-
certed activity in a literal sense exists,85 the Court creates an
inequality between the protection afforded to union and non-
union employees. The Court vindicates the rights of a union
employee to complain or refuse to work because of safety or
health violations,8 6 but leaves nonunion employees without
section 7 protection for the same activity.
This disparity is especially significant in light of the
Board's retreat87 from Alleluia Cushion Co.88 and Air Surrey
Corp. 8 9 Under the Board's current policy, nonunion employ-
ees are without section 7 protection when they individually
voice complaints to their employers, refuse to perform unsafe
work,90 or try to enforce statutory provisions relating to their
employment, 91 although these activities directly affect co-
workers as well.92  This is startlingly clear when James
Brown's situation in City Disposal Systems is compared with
that in Meyers Industries.9 3 In both cases, the individual em-
ployees refused to drive trucks they believed to be unsafe. In
Brown's case, a collective bargaining agreement covering this
refusal was in effect, so Brown's activity was deemed con-
83. See Dolin, supra note 26, at 584.
84. City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1513.
85. See id. at 1512.
86. It is well settled that safety and health are mandatory subjects of bargaining.
See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW (2d ed.
1983).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
88. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
89. 229 N.L.R.B. 1064 (1977), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1979).
90. See, e.g., Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. -, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1029-30
(1984); Comet Fast Freight, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 430, 431 (1982).
91. See, e.g., Wabco Constr. & Mining Equip. Group, 270 N.L.R.B. __, 116
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1171 (1984).
92. See, e.g., Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B .... 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025, 1034
(1984) (Zimmerman dissenting).
93. 268 N.L.R.B. -, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1025 (1984).
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certed. 94 In contrast, the truck driver in Meyers had no pro-
tection under section 7 because his actions were not made
with or on behalf of another employee and no collective bar-
gaining agreement was in effect.95
In both cases, other employees would benefit from the ac-
tivities of these employees. The discharge of these individuals
tends to discourage other employees from taking similar ac-
tion, or attempting to enlist the aid of others in voicing similar
grievances. This is especially tragic when unsafe conditions
exist and the sole brave individual who speaks up in protest is
discharged. 96
The labor laws were designed, in part, to protect employ-
ees from the tyranny of the employer.97 Protecting two em-
ployees acting together while refusing to extend this
protection to a single employee not covered by a collective
bargaining agreement and whose activities are likely to benefit
other employees has no justification,98 and neither does a dic-
tionary definition of the term "concerted activities." 99 Indeed,
perhaps the word "concerted" should never have been in-
cluded in section 7 in view of the language of the section 9(a)
proviso which provides "[t]hat any individual employee...
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
[sic] employer. . ."00 This language clearly implies that an
individual employee does have the right to complain to the
employer.101 It would seem quite anomalous to suppose that
Congress would encourage individuals to present grievances
94. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1516.
95. See Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. at , 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1029.
96. See Comment, supra note 40 at 836.
97. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1513.
98. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 35, at 348 (a collective bargaining agreement
should not be required before finding an individual's activities concerted). See also
Comment, supra note 40, at 820-21 (there is nothing to suggest that congressional pur-
pose of encouraging organization is furthered by protection of two employees). But cf.
Note, Concerted Activity, supra note 37, at 389 (the underlying policy of the NLRA is to
preserve the institution of collective bargaining).
99. See supra note 35.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
101. But see Note, supra note 54, at 1004-05 (the federal courts have taken the
position that the only effect of the proviso is to make it plain that employers can receive
grievances without violating their duty to bargain with the exclusive representative).
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and then allow employers to discharge them for exercising
this right. 10 2
In a nonunion setting, where the employees have no col-
lective bargaining agreement to protect their interests, al-
lowing individuals to enforce statutory provisions relating to
their employment would appear particularly important. By
requiring the existence of a collective bargaining agreement
before an individual can voice a complaint, nonunion employ-
ees are put at a severe disadvantage. 0 3 This inequality would
seem contrary to the Act which provides that employees have
the right to refrain from forming or joining labor
organizations. 101
The dissent's position rests primarily on the fact that the
holding of the majority will allow the Board to make unfair
labor practice claims out of all disputes. 10 5 This argument
loses much of its strength, however, because if an employee
seeks the aid of a single employee or seeks to represent one
other employee, the dissent would find the employee protected
by section 7.106 The dissent correctly stated that the labor
laws were designed to encourage unionization, 10 7 but failed to
point out how expanding this position to include individual
activity would undermine unionization. The dissent adhered
to a rigid, technical definition of the term "concerted" that
was not, in all likelihood, intended by Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court found the Board's In-
terboro doctrine to be a reasonable interpretation of section 7
of the NLRA. The decision protects the rights of individual
102. See Dolin, supra note 26, at 563-64. For a discussion of the section 9(a) pro-
viso, see Gorman & Finkin, supra note 35, at 356-57; and Note, supra note 54, at 1003-
05.
103. This is particularly true since about three-quarters of the workers in the
United States are not members of unions. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 35, at 287
(citing the U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 429 table 714 (101st ed. 1980).
104. See 29 U.S.C. § 157. See supra note 3 for the text of section 7.
105. See Note, supra note 54, at 1013-14.
106. See City Disposal Sys., 104 S. Ct. at 1517-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 1518. For a discussion on how extending protection to an individual
would affect unionization and collective bargaining, see Comment, supra note 40, at
820-21; Note, supra note 54, at 1000-01.
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union employees who assert a right under the collective bar-
gaining agreement that will likely affect their co-workers. The
decision, however, fails to extend this protection to nonunion
employees who engage in the same activities, although these
activities would affect the entire group as well. In this respect,
the protection afforded in this decision is not complete.*
VICKY M. PHILLIPS
* In the wake of NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Meyers Industries, Inc. See Prill v. NLRB,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-1 (February 28, 1985).
The District of Columbia Circuit held that the Board's decision in Meyers rested on
an erroneous view of the law, both when it decided its new definition of concerted activi-
ties was mandated by the NLRA and when it stated it was returning to the standard
which the Board and courts relied on before Alleluia Cushion Co. See Prill, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) at D-1 to-2. The court stated that City Disposal "makes [it] unmis-
takably clear that contrary to the Board's view in Meyers, neither the language nor the
history of section 7 requires that the term 'concerted activities' be interpreted to protect
only the most narrowly defined forms of common action by employees, and that the
Board has substantial responsibility to determine the score of protection in order to
promote the purposes of the NLRA." DAILY LAB. REP. at D-8. In addition, the court
found that the test in Meyers did not represent a return to the standard relied on by the
courts and the Board before Alleluia, but created a more restrictive standard. See
DAILY LAB. REP. at D-9. The court therefore remanded the case to permit the Board
to reconsider Meyers in light of City Disposal.
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